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IV 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(i)(1987 ) . Plaintiff 
appealed from the findings of fact and judgment of the trial 
court. Defendant cross-appealed. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court's finding with respect to 
missing equipment supported by the clear weight of the evidence? 
2. Was the trial court's finding with respect to 
defective equipment erroneous? 
3. Were plaintiffs erroneously awarded an offset for 
the repair of defective equipment? 
4. Was the denial of any offset for payroll expense or 
loss on resale within the discretion of the trial court? 
5. Was the award to defendant of interest compounded 
monthly on the unpaid principal balance of the Promissory Note 
proper? 
6. Was the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to 
the plaintiffs improper? 
7. Did the trial court act properly and within its 
discretion in amending the judgment to include defendant's 
social security number, as required by the Administrative Order 
No, 25 of the Fourth Judicial District? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Plaintiffs filed their Amended 
Complaint on January 25, 1984, claiming that defendants had 
breached a contract between the parties for purchase of a radio 
station, had failed to pay debts due and owing to third 
parties, and had interferred with the plaintiffs1 sale of the 
assets to a third party. Plaintiffs requested that the Court 
award damages for breach, order the defendants to pay 
obligations due and enjoin the defendants from foreclosing on 
plaintiffs1 mortgage securing the Promissory Note or otherwise 
interferring with the sale of the assets to a third party. 
Defendants counterclaimed for the balance due from 
plaintiffs on the Promissory Note and guarantees executed in 
connection with the sale, for attorneys1 fees and punitive 
damages for tortious breach of contract. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below. 
This case was tried to the court without a jury on September 15 
and 16, 1986. Sterrett Neale was dismissed at the beginning of 
the trial. (T. 2) Plaintiffs did not present evidence with 
regard to the cause of action for unpaid obligations or with 
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regard to the request for an injunction against defendant, 
limiting the issues before the court to those arising from the 
alleged breach of contract. The trial court entered its 
Memorandum Decision on February 24, 1987, (R. 301-10) and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 312-24) and a 
Judgment (R. 325-26) were entered on March 24, 1987. 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New Trial Or In The Alternative 
To Amend The Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law And 
Judgment on March 30, 1987 (R. 328-29), which motion was denied 
by ruling entered on April 15, 1987. (R. 358-59) Plaintiffs 
filed their Notice of Appeal on April 16, 1987. (R. 363) 
Neale Broadcast Alliance filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on 
April 29, 1987. (R. 377-78) 
On April 6, 1987, the defendant filed a motion seeking to 
add a social security number to the judgment to conform to the 
Fourth Judicial District's Administrative Order 25 and allow 
disbursal of the funds on deposit to the defendant. 
(R. 354-55) The Order inserting the social security number of 
Sterrett Neale, sole surviving shareholder of Neale Broadcast 
Alliance, was signed and entered on April 7, (R. 356-57) and 
the money was disbursed on April 15, 1987. (R. 361-62) 
Plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the Order and compel a 
return of the funds on April 29. (R. 380-81). The motion was 
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denied by Order entered on May 8, 1987. (R. 392-93) 
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal from that Order on June 5, 
1987. 
Plaintiffs also filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus 
seeking the same relief on or about June 4, 1987. (Case No. 
870206) The Petition was denied on July 13, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Mountain States Broadcasing Company is a 
Colorado corporation which operates, buys and sells radio 
stations. (T. 26-28, 69) Plaintiff Dan Lacy is a resident of 
the State of Colorado and President of Mountain States. 
(T. 24) Defendant Neale Broadcast Alliance was a Utah 
corporation in good standing until October of 1982, at which 
time it was voluntarily dissolved. (T. 357) 
The parties entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement 
dated the 21st day of November, 1981, wherein Neale Broadcast 
Alliance was designated as seller and Dan Lacy, individually 
and on behalf of Mountain States, was designated as buyer, for 
the purchase of KTMP-FM and KONI-AM. The purchase was to 
include the radio stations, their FCC licenses and assets 
described in the Asset Purchase Agreement (Plaintiff's Exh. 1), 
Article II, "Sale and Purchase Assets." The purchase price was 
$325,000.00. 
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The Asset Purchase Agreement executed at closing 
warranted that personal property in active use in the station's 
operation would be in good repair unless otherwise noted, 
(Exh. 1, p. 9) 
Plaintiff Dan Lacy, an FCC licensed engineer, visited the 
radio stations several times and also just before the closing 
at the end of June, 1982, (T. 34) During the two-day closing, 
Sterrett Neale had informed plaintiff Lacy that there were two 
tape machines in the front production room that were not 
working right, and that Mr. Neale would see that those were 
fixed within two weeks of the date of closing. (T. 538) Neale 
Broadcasting submitted a statement that the equipment was in 
good working order. (Exh. 6) 
The sale closed on June 30, 1982. (T. 34) Plaintiff 
Mountain States made, executed and delivered to defendant a 
Promissory Note in the principal amount of $90,929.99. 
Payments were to be made monthly, and interest was to accrue at 
the rate of 10% per annum. (Exh. 2) The note contains the 
following provision, "Should interest not be paid when due, it 
shall thereafter bear like interest as the principal." To 
further secure the payment of the obligations evidenced by that 
Promissory Note, Mountain States executed a Security Agreement 
in defendant's favor, (Exh. 3) and plaintiff Lacy executed his 
individual guaranty. (Exh. 4) 
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On July 1, 1982, defendant turned over to the plaintiff 
radio station KONI-AM and radio station KTMP-FM and all the 
assets which were "used or useful" in connection with the 
operation of both stations and certain assets which were not 
used or useful in the operation of said radio stations, but 
which were included as part of the premises transferred. 
(Exh. 1) Some such assets were kept for spare parts only. 
(T. 254-55, 558) Mr. Neale was scheduled to meet with 
plaintiff Lacy on the morning of July 1, 1982, to turn over the 
assets, but plaintiff Lacy was unable to meet at the studio. 
(T. 538) Some time following the closing, plaintiff Lacy 
composed a detailed inventory of items of personal property on 
the station premises which he claimed were missing or not 
working and submitted the same to the trial court. (Exhs. 19 
and 20) The trial court concluded that plaintiff Lacy was an 
engineer, expert in the operation of radio stations and radio 
station equipment, and that he and thereby Mountain States had 
to have been aware at the time of the sale that the sale 
included aging equipment in use which was in good repair, and 
other equipment not in use, not necessarily operable. 
(R. 315) 
Plaintiffs offered testimony that certain of the 
equipment included in the asset and purchase sale was either 
missing or not in good working order, and that as a result, 
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plaintiffs were required to hire extra personnel (T. 151-53 and 
Exh. 16) to operate the AM station and were required to allow 
an offset of $5,500,00 upon the re-sale of the AM station due 
to the condition of the equipment. (T. 59-60) Defendant 
offered testimony that the equipment designated in the 
agreement was all present, and the equipment in use was in 
working order at the time of closing. (T. 551-52) 
Defendant offered the testimony of Sterrett Neale and a 
copy of the schedule of assets which showed that certain items 
marked by an asterisk were specifically designated not in use 
and other items were lined out, designating that they were not 
part of the sale. (Exh. 9) Testimony regarding the "missing 
equipment" list (Exh. 19) revealed that the items on Exhibit 19 
were either expressly excluded from the sale, or were actually 
still on the premises of the radio station months after the 
closing. (T. 244-280; Exh. 69) 
The Ampex tape recorder and accessories were "not 
working" at the time of the sale. (Exh. 1, Schedule 2) These 
items, however, were designated not part of the equipment in 
active use in operation of the station. 
Plaintiffs sold the AM station license and certain assets 
to a third party for the sum of $225,000.00. (T. 59) 
Plaintiffs claimed to have notified defendant by letters 
that there were certain items of equipment not in good repair 
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and working order and that there were certain items of 
equipment missing at the time of the transfer of the radio 
stations. However, the letters fail utterly to detail any 
specific items of equipment complained of. (T. 120-22) The 
Asset Purchase Agreement provided that the plaintiff, Mountain 
States, would be entitled to setoffs for defective or missing 
property if the plaintiff buyer gave notice to the seller, in 
writing, of the claimed defect or omission and defendant failed 
to cure within sixty days. (Exh. 1, 11116.2.2 and 6.2.3) 
Plaintiff admitted in his testimony that he made no written 
complaint regarding any specific item of equipment at any 
time. 
In May of 1983, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to pay 
to the defendant the sum of $59,587.16, and defendants were to 
deposit $10,000.00 in the form of a bond with the Clerk of the 
Court to secure payment of attorneys' fees and costs which 
might be awarded. (R. 33-35) Plaintiffs were directed to 
deposit a $15,000.00 bond for attorneys1 fees as required by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court further ordered 
that the plaintiffs deposit with the Clerk of the Court the sum 
of $30,000.00 to be held in an interest-bearing account to 
apply toward any judgment ordered obtained by the defendant. 
Defendant posted a certificate of deposit in the sum of 
$10,000.00. (R. 360-6]) Plaintiffs finally deposited the sum 
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of $30,000.00 with the Clerk of the Court on July 24, 1984, 
(R. 59-60) and never posted the $15,000,00 bond. (R. 320) 
Following the entry of the Judgment, defendant found that 
despite the requirement of the Judgment that the Fourth 
District Clerk release defendant's funds, the clerk refused to 
do so until the form of the Judgment conformed with the Fourth 
District's Administrative Order No. 25 by including, for income 
tax reporting purposes, the social security number of the party 
to whom funds were to be released. Defendant presented a 
Motion and Order in accordance with both local and state Rules 
of Civil Procedure and Practice for the purpose of satisfying 
the Administrative Order. (R. 354) The Court amended the 
Judgment and the funds were disbursed. (R. 361-62) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The gravamen of this appeal is plaintiffs1 contention 
that their evidence must be believed whenever there is a 
conflict. Plaintiffs assert that the findings of the trial 
court are unsupported by the evidence, even though that 
evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
conclusions of the trial court. Defendant responds that, with 
two exceptions, the findings of the trial court were supported 
by a clear preponderance of the evidence. 
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Plaintiffs received the benefits of their bargain in the 
purchase of the radio stations, and all the equipment which was 
part of the sale was present and in good working order. The 
finding that no material items of equipment were missing at the 
date of closing is supported by the weight of the evidence. 
The finding that certain equipment was defective (namely, the 
control design brain and two carousels) is erroneous, and the 
trial court improperly awarded plaintiffs an offset for the 
repair of defective equipment. 
The trial court's denial of any offset for payroll 
expense or loss on resale of the station was within its 
discretion. 
The award to defendant of interest compounded monthly on 
the unpaid principal balance of the Promissory Note was based 
upon a proper construction of the language of the contract and 
caselaw. 
Defendant was entitled to the award of attorneys" fees 
pursuant to the language of the Promissory Note and individual 
guarantee as the prevailing party. The award of attorneys' 
fees to the plaintiffs was error. 
The Court acted properly and within its discretion in 
entering the Order of April 7, 1987, in order to correct the 
clerical error and satisfy the Fourth District's Administrative 
Order No. 25. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING WITH RESPECT 
TO MISSING EQUIPMENT IS SUPPORTED BY 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiffs have challenged the trial court's finding 
that, regarding equipment listed on Schedule 2 to the Asset 
Purchase Agreement (Exh. 1), "there were no material items 
missing." (R. 316, 1115) Defendant asserts that the finding is 
supported by the clear weight of the evidence. Plaintiffs have 
correctly acknowledged their obligation to marshal all the 
evidence concerning contested findings, including that 
favorable to defendant. (Brief of Appellants, p. 11) 
Plaintiffs have failed to do so. 
The evidence regarding missing equipment included Lacy!s 
testimony that twenty-three items were missing. The finding of 
the Court, after presentation of considerable evidence by both 
parties, was that no material items were missing, (R. 316, 
1115) Plaintiffs appeal that decision as to five items with a 
total value of $2,897.49. 
Mountain States argues that the court was required to 
accept its version of the facts. However, 
[wjhere the evidence is in conflict, the 
supreme court must defer to the trial court's 
first-hand assessment of the witness's 
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credibility and assume that the trial court 
believed those aspects of the evidence which 
support its findings. 
Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 
(Utah 1982). Defendant presented considerable testimony 
regarding the equipment which plaintiffs claim to be missing. 
Sterrett Neale testified that he was to meet Dan Lacy at the 
station on the morning of the turnover of assets, July 1, 1982, 
and that he offered to do an inventory of equipment at that 
time. Mr. Lacy failed to appear and his representatives 
refused Mr. Neale's offer. (T. 538) He now asks this Court to 
overturn the trial court based solely on his unverified 
inventory, in spite of the evidence in the record to the 
contrary. 
Regarding the specific items of equipment identified in 
plaintiffs1 appeal, there was testimony as follows: 
a. Ampex Play-Back Electronics: Steven Hope, 
general manager of KONI after the sale in September, 
1982, testified that the Ampex equipment was present in 
the station and in working condition. (T. 193-95) 
George Culbertson, former owner and station engineer, 
testified that the Ampex equipment and the pre-amplifiers 
were in the station when he performed an inventory in 
December, 1983. (T. 277, Exh. 69) Michael Pearce, a 
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disc jockey at the station after July 1, 1982, used the 
Ampex play-back equipment. (T. 302) 
b. Tape pre-amps: Mr. Culbertson testified that 
these were in the station and in working order, but not 
in use in December, 1983. (T. 276-77) Malcolm Crawford, 
an engineer familiar with the equipment at KONI in June, 
1982, testified that the pre-amps were in the basement of 
the station. (T. 492) 
c. Stereo Heads: Mr. Culbertson testified that 
the stereo heads had been installed in the Ampex 
equipment. (T. 279) Mr. Crawford testified that the 
four Ampex PR10 play-back machines were in the basement 
of the station long after the sale. (T. 482) 
d. Oscilloscope: Mr. Culbertson testified that 
the oscilloscope was at the transmitter site. (T. 277) 
Mr. Crawford recalled oscilloscopes in two locations, the 
transmitter room and the transmitter site on the 
mountain. (T. 478) 
e. Noise and Distortion Meter: Plaintiffs claim 
that Mr. Culbertson's testimony substantiates a missing 
noise and distortion meter. (T. 280) Culbertsonfs 
inventory was not performed, however, until eighteen 
months following the sale of the station to Mountain 
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States, Mr. Neale testified that in June, 1982, the 
noise and distortion meter was in the station. (T. 562) 
The trial court compared the testimony summarized above 
with Lacyfs testimony and, in its discretion, determined that 
no material items of equipment were missing. Viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Court below, the evidence presented 
above is sufficient to support the findings of fact and Neale 
Broadcast urges this Court to leave these findings 
undisturbed. 
POINT II 
THE COURTfS FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO 
DEFECTIVE CONTROL DESIGN BRAIN AND CAROUSELS 
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The appropriate standard of review for findings of fact 
has been set forth previously. Plaintiffs have appealed 
claiming they are entitled to a greater offset for the control 
design brain and two carousels than the $6,000.00 awarded by 
the Court. Defendant cross-appeals on the same issue, and 
contends that the evidence requires a finding that the brain 
and carousels were in good operating condition. 
Plaintiffs' appeal of this issue is based on an argument 
not raised in the proceedings before the trial court. 
Specifically, on page 10 of Appellantfs Amended Brief, 
plaintiffs argue that the warranty of equipment in the Asset 
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Purchase Agreement actually constituted two separate 
warranties: (1) that all of the transmitting and studio 
equipment would be in good repair and working order; and (2) 
that the personal property listed in Schedule 2 which was in 
active use in operation of the station would be in good repair 
and working order at the time of closing. 
By this warranty, therefore, Neale Broadcast 
warranted that all of the transmitting and 
studio equipment (the first three categories on 
Schedule 2) were in good repair and working 
order. This warranty was not limited to only 
those items of transmitting and studio 
equipment in active use. With respect to all 
other assets listed on Schedule 2, however, the 
warranty was limited to only those items 
presently in active use in the operation of the 
stations. 
(App. Amended Br., p.10) 
This Court has often repeated the rule that matters not 
presented to the trial court for decision are not reviewable on 
appeal. Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P. 2d 856 (Utah 1984). 
Plaintiffs argue that all of defendant's transmitting and 
studio equipment was subject to an unconditional warranty that 
it was in good repair and working order. In fact, however, the 
notations to Schedule 2 to the Asset Purchase Agreement which 
were admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1, specifically identify 
certain pieces of equipment as either "not in use" (by 
asterisk) or "not part of the sale" (lined out). (T. 561/ 
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Schedule 2 to Exh. 1) Plaintiffs were fully aware of the 
status of the equipment and negotiated the purchase price 
accordingly. Much of the equipment sold was for "back-up" or 
spare parts only, and much was included simply because it was 
present in the basement. (T. 253-56) Plaintiff Lacy had 
observed the equipment and its operation on several occasions. 
(T. 34) Plaintiffs cannot now be allowed to argue that the 
equipment was subject to an unconditional warranty. 
The trial court concluded that the equipment warranted to 
be in working order was, in fact, in working order with the 
exception of the control brain and two carousels. Plaintiffs 
claim that the finding was erroneous. First, plaintiffs claim 
that they should have received an offset for the cartel. 
Mr. Neale, Mr. Smith and Mr. Carter all testified that the 
automation equipment, including the cartel, was in regular 
daily use up until the last day that they operated the 
station. (T. 537, 416, 393-397) 
Second, plaintiffs ask damages of $1,500.00 for an 
additional carousel. Mr. Crawford testified that only three of 
the carousels were in regular use at the time of the sale, and 
the other three were not. (T. 471) Mr. Lacy testified that he 
removed three carousels, shipped them to his own station in 
Durango, and was using them at present. Plaintiffs concede 
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that there is testimony from a defense witness who worked at 
the station as an announcer that all of the carousels were in 
use and functioning at the time of the transfer of the station 
assets in June, 1982. (T. 420) 
Third, plaintiffs demand an offset alleging the Magnecord 
recorder was not functioning. The Magnecord recorder was 
specifically identified on the Schedule 2 list of assets as 
"not in use" in the daily operation of the station, and is 
therefore exempt from warranty. 
Defendant submits that the testimony set forth above is 
sufficient to support the Court's finding that Mountain States 
was entitled to no offset for the cartel and Magnecord 
recorder. With regard to the finding that the control brain 
and two carousels were inoperable, however, defendant submits 
that such a conclusion is not supported by the evidence. 
Testimony established that the control brain was present 
in the station and in use in the daily operation of the 
automation equipment at the time of the transfer of assets on 
June 30, 1982. (T. 493, 516) The testimony of Mr. Crawford, 
who was performing engineering duties at the radio station both 
before and after the sale and was extremely knowledgeable about 
the condition of the equipment, was that the automation system 
developed problems and the control brain ceased to function 
properly after the sale. (T. 513-17) Mr. Crawford testified 
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that one evening in approximately August or September of 1982, 
he was called by Mr, Harold, a disc jockey at Mountain States 
Broadcasting, regarding a failure in the automation system 
brain. Mr. Crawford could not get the brain to operate 
thereafter. Mr. Crawford's notes were admitted as Exhibit 15. 
The brain of the automation system never functioned after 
that date, and Mr. Culbertson was unable to get it working 
again when he was hired to attempt to do so in September of 
1982. (T. 263) Clearly, this failure occurred after the 
closing, after risk of loss had passed to the plaintiffs. 
Defendant also contends that the evidence does not 
support the conclusion that plaintiffs were entitled to an 
offset for two carousels not functioning properly. Mr. Lacy 
testified there were seven carousel-type pieces of equipment, 
that six were called carousels and one called a "cartel." 
(T. 95) The cartel has been discussed above, was not in use 
and not, therefore, subject to the warranty. As set forth 
above, Mr. Crawford testified that three carousels were not in 
regular use at the time of the sale. They are therefore exempt 
from any warranty of personal property. Mr. Lacy removed three 
carousels to his station in Durango and the remaining carousels 
were sold by plaintiffs to a third party, as part of the sale 
of the radio station KONI. Inasmuch as all six of the 
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carousels which were in use at the time of sale were either 
used or sold thereafter, plaintiffs cannot claim offset. 
Furthermore, the value of three carousels has been 
overstated by the plaintiffs; Mr. Culbertson testified that the 
total cost of three carousels, purchased used in 1974, was 
$1,773.91. Mountain States1 contention that it should receive 
an offset in the amount of $1,500.00 for each inoperable 
carousel is obviously excessive. 
Defendant offered further testimony that the equipment 
was not properly maintained and cared for after the date of 
sale (T. 372,376, 383, 402, 517-18) and that Mountain States1 
personnel were inexperienced in equipment maintenance and were 
specifically instructed by plaintiffs to concentrate their 
attention on the other two stations they were operating at the 
time and to operate KONI on full-time automation for the sole 
purpose of staying on the air to maintain the FCC license until 
sale of that station to a third party had been consummated. 
(T. 346, 501-504) 
Defendant contends that evidence as to the condition of 
equipment following the date of sale is irrelevant to the 
issues before this Court, and that plaintiffs failed to carry 
their burden to establish that any equipment was inoperable at 
the time of sale, even when the evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to the finding of the trial court. 
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Consequently, defendant was not in breach of the contract of 
sale, and plaintiffs are entitled to no offset. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY AWARDED PLAINTIFFS AN 
OFFSET FOR THE REPAIR OF DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT. 
Defendant respectfully directs the Courtfs attention to 
the numerous instances of recorded testimony that the control 
design brain was functioning at the time ownership was 
transferred to plaintiffs. Mr. Crawford testified that the 
brain was in daily use as part of the automation equipment 
until June 30, 1982, (T. 493) and only failed late in the 
summer of 1982. (T. 513-517) Mr. Watkins, also an engineer 
for the station, testified that the brain worked properly and 
dependably. (T. 372) Mr. Smith testified that the automation 
equipment was used until the transfer to plaintiffs. (T. 416) 
Mr. Hall testified that the automation equipment needed 
attention after the sale but was never unusable (T. 343) and 
was used after the sale to keep KONI on the air. (T. 344) 
Mr. Carter used it after the sale; (T. 393-397) Mr. Pearce 
operated it every day after the sale. (T. 308) Mr. Culbertson 
found it inoperable in October, 1982. (T. 262) Defendant is 
not aware of any evidence that the brain was inoperable at the 
time of transfer and suggests that the evidence above does not 
-20-
support a finding that the equipment was not working properly 
or that plaintiffs were entitled to an offset. 
In the event that this Court determines that plaintiffs 
are entitled to an offset, defendant submits that the trial 
court's calculation of the measure of damages is the only 
proper calculation for said repair. Plaintiffs cite Ault v. 
Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1987) for the proposition that 
the proper measure of damages would be replacement cost, or 
$25,000.00, as asserted by plaintiffs. The following language 
from Ault contradicts plaintiffs1 proposition: 
It is in the context of the damaged or 
destroyed items of personal property where 
evidence of replacement cost seems least 
appropriate, especially since many of the items 
were old, worn, or otherwise marginal to begin 
with, and the date of damage or destruction was 
unknown. . . . 
Ault, p. 1122, Note 7. 
Plaintiffs concede that cost of repair is typically an 
appropriate measure of damages. (Appellants1 Amended Brief 
p. 16) However, plaintiffs seek to claim the entire original 
cost of the automation equipment as damages, rather than the 
cost of repair. Defendant is unaware of any evidence that the 
control brain was irreparable, only that Mr. Culbertson had 
been unable to repair it. Consequently, the court reasonably 
relied on Mr. Culbertson's evaluation of the cost of repair of 
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the brain, as set forth in Exhibit 68: "Estimated repair cost 
$2,000.00 to $3,000.00, plus $200.00 to $400.00 in parts on 
carousels." At most, Mountain States would be entitled only to 
an offset equal to the "market value" at the time of taking of 
the property. Ault, p. 1121. 
POINT IV 
THE TPIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF ANY OFFSET FOP PAYROLL 
EXPENSE OR LOSS ON RESALE WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION. 
Once the trial court had determined whether the control 
design brain and carousels were operable at the time the 
station was transferred to plaintiffs, the issues of whether 
payroll expense or loss on resale could be attributed to any 
breach by defendant was an issue of fact. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a) provides: "Findings of fact, whether based on 
oral or documentary evidence shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." 
Testimony before the trial court indicated that the 
decision to operate the radio station manually rather than by 
automation was determined by choice, rather than by necessity. 
For example, Mr. Hope testified that the control brain and 
attendant equipment was present in the station after the sale, 
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but was not needed or used. (T. 199) Several employees of the 
station testified that the automation equipment was available 
and used to keep KONI on the air. (T. 344, 308, 393-97) 
Mr. Harold, who testified that the equipment was difficult to 
work with, also testified that he preferred to work live. 
(T. 324) Although Mr. Lacy testified that extra payroll 
expense was incurred because "the automation and things didnft 
work," (T. 151) the trial court would be justified in making 
its own assessment of the witnesses1 credibility and its 
determination that no payroll expense was attributable to the 
condition of the automation equipment was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
Similarly, Mr. Lacy testified that he had been required 
to give an offset in the sum of $5,500.00 on the resale of 
KONI, due to non-functional and missing equipment. (T. 59-60) 
According to Exhibit 63, Mountain States was able to sell the 
AM station, KONI, to a third party on July 26, 1982, for the 
sum of $225,000.00. Defendant submits that plaintiffs1 claim 
that they were required to reduce the purchase price in the sum 
of $5,500.00 due to the condition of the equipment does not 
make sense. In that sale, Mountain States warranted only that 
the physical assets of the station would be maintained in their 
present condition between the date of sale and the date of 
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closing. If such a setoff occurred between Mountain States and 
the purchaser, it could be attributable only to damages 
occurring to the physical assets of the station between July 1, 
1982, and September 30, 1982, when the assets and operation of 
KONI were transferred to the purchaser. The trial courtfs 
finding was supported by the evidence. 
Defendant further contends that plaintiffs have failed to 
prove any damages at all resulting from the conduct of the 
defendant. In Utah, damages must be proven as follows: 
It is also a general rule long standing that a 
plaintiff must show damages by evidence of 
facts and not by mere conclusions and that the 
items of damage must be established by 
substantial evidence and not by conjecture. 
Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d 
597 (1962); Bingham C & L Co. v. Board of 
Education, 61 Utah 149, 159; 211 P. 981 
(1922) . And, whether general or special, 
damages must be traceable to the wrongs 
complained of. Ranch Homes Inc. v. Greater 
Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620 (1979). 
Highland Const. Co. v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 683 P.2d 
1042, 1045 (Utah 1984) . 
In the Highland case, the court found that the plaintiff, 
Highland, failed to prove its cost for each alleged problem or 
breach caused by the defendants, failed to compare its 
estimates with actual costs for each such problem or breach, 
and failed to prove that defendants were solely responsible for 
any alleged additional expense. In addition, Highland failed 
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to prove a causation between its cost and the breach of any 
particular defendant. 
With respect to the action at hand, defendant submits 
that plaintiffs, like the Highland plaintiff above, failed to 
establish damages traceable to any action of the defendant. 
Plaintiffs purchased KONI and KTMP from Neale Broadcast for the 
sum of $325,000.00, and within a month of closing, resold KONI 
for $225,000.00. Within nine months from the date of closing, 
Mountain States had sold KTMP (together with radio station KFTN 
which was already owned by the plaintiffs) for the sum of 
$1,200,000.00 to another third party. (T. 108, Exh. 64) 
With such testimony and evidence before the court, it 
could reasonably, and without abuse of its discretion, conclude 
that plaintiffs had suffered no damage attributable to the 
condition of the equipment at the time the radio station assets 
were transferred. As set forth in Hal Taylor Associates, 
supra, this Court must assume that the trial court believed 
those aspects of the evidence which support its findings. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED TO DEFENDANT 
INTEREST COMPOUNDED MONTHLY ON THE UNPAID 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE. 
Mountain States has appealed from the trial court's award 
of interest compounded monthly, citing cases from California 
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and Washington which have refused to award compound interest. 
There is Utah case law which supports the decision of the trial 
court. 
The Promissory Note states in the second paragraph: 
This note shall bear interest upon the unpaid 
principal balance hereof from the date hereof 
until paid at a rate of 10% per annum. Should 
interest not be paid when due, it shall 
thereafter bear like interest as the 
principal. 
The second sentence of the contract paragraph would be 
meaningless unless unpaid interest was to be compounded for 
each payment period, that is, monthly. The specific addition 
of a sentence stating "should interest not be paid when due it 
shall thereafter bear like interest as the principal" can only 
be understood to add to the terms of the note the special 
provision that past-due unpaid interest which is payable 
monthly shall earn interest on a monthly basis, that is, the 
interest shall be compounded monthly. The policy behind such a 
provision as a penalty for late payments is also eminently 
reasonable. 
Defendant relies on the case of Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 
45 Utah 320, 145 P. 1036 (Utah 1915). In Jensen, the Utah 
Supreme Court was called upon to construe the following 
language: 
If any interest remains due and unpaid for the 
period of thirty days then the principal sum 
and all accrued and unpaid interest shall at 
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once be due and payable at the option of the 
holder of this note and the principal sum and 
all unpaid interest shall then draw interest at 
the rate of 12% per annum until paid. 
The Jensen defendants had promised to pay the interest 
quarterly. The court reasoned that if defendants had paid 
plaintiff the interest when due, he could have reloaned it to 
them, or could have loaned it to anyone else, and could have 
contracted for any rate of interest not exceeding 12% per 
annum. The plaintiff, therefore, was as much entitled to 
interest upon the unpaid interest as though it had been paid to 
him when due and he had reloaned it, and was entitled to 
interest upon each quarterly installment of interest from the 
time it became due until the principal and interest were merged 
into judgment. Jensen at 1041. 
The Jensen case is quoted with approval in Farnworth v. 
Jensen, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 571 (Utah 1950). The contract 
in Farnworth provided for the payment of interest at the rate 
of 6% per annum and each yearly payment was to include the 
amount of this interest. Once again, the court concluded that 
the plaintiff was entitled to interest upon the unpaid interest 
as though it had been paid to him when due and he had reloaned 
it. Farnworth at 577. 
The parties agreed that plaintiffs1 payments on the 
principal amount were to be made on a monthly basis. (Exh. 2) 
Neale Broadcast submits that the language of the Note can only 
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be construed to require that interest was also payable monthly, 
and should earn interest on a monthly basis. The trial court 
so concluded, and that conclusion is a proper application of 
the principles of law to the language of the Note. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURTfS AWARD OF ATTORNEYS1 FEES TO 
THE DEFENDANT WAS PROPER AND THE AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS1 FEES TO THE PLAINTIFFS WAS IMPROPER. 
There are three provisions for payment of attorney fees 
which are a part of the contractual agreement between the 
parties. In Exhibit 1, the Asset Purchase Agreement, paragrah 
10.6 on page 23 provides: 
In the event of commencement of suit by either 
party to enforce the provisions of this 
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to receive attorneys1 fees and costs 
as a court may adjudge reasonable in addition 
to any other relief granted. (Emphasis added.) 
The Promissory Note, Exhibit 2, provides in paragraph 4: 
The undersigned promises to pay costs of 
collection and attorneys1 fees in reasonable 
amount if default is made in the payment of 
this Note, (Emphasis added.) 
The individual Guaranty, Exhibit 4, page 2 in the second 
full paragraph states: 
T
^
e
 .undersigned further agrees without demand 
immediately to reimburse Neale for all costs 
and expenses including attorneys1 fees incurred 
in the enforcement of this Guaranty or the 
collection of such indebtedness. (Emphasis 
added. ) 
-28-
The language in the Asset Purchase Agreement contains the 
phrase "prevailing party." Under the Promissory Note, if the 
Court finds that the plaintiff Mountain States Eroadcasting 
Corporation is in default in payment of the Mote, defendant is 
entitled to its costs of collection and attorneys1 fees in 
reasonable amount. The provision in the Individual Guaranty is 
not so limited. Mr. Lacy agreed to reimburse Neale for all 
costs and expenses, including attorneys1 fees, incurred in the 
enforcement of the Guaranty or the collection of the 
indebtedness. Defendant submits simply based upon the 
Individual Guaranty that Mr. Lacy is obligated to pay all 
attorneys1 fees incurred in connection with the collection of 
the indebtedness due and owing under the Promissory Note, and 
that there is no limitation on the amount and that therefore 
the defendant should be awarded all attorneys1 fees incurred, 
including fees incurred in connection with post trial motions, 
the Writ of Mandamus and the appeal. 
A. Defendant is entitled to an award of attorney fees 
under applicable case law regarding fees to be recovered in 
accordance with contract terms. 
The general parameters for an award of attorney fees are 
set forth in the case of Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haaais 
- • - -
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 662 (Utah 1982). In that case, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
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Utah adheres to the well established rule that 
attorney's fees generally cannot be recovered 
unless provided for by statute or by contract. 
B&R Supply Company v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 
442, 503 P-2d 1216 (1972)• If by contract, the 
award of attorney's fees is allowed only in 
accordance with the terms of the contract. 25 
CJS Damages, §50 (1966). The amount to be 
awarded as attorneyfs fees is generally within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. Yreka 
United, Inc. v. Harrison, Idaho, 510 P.2d 775, 
780 (1973). 
In the case of Traynor v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 
1984), 1988, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the granting of 
attorney fees to the party entitled thereto by contract is not 
discretionary with the court, but mandatory. The amount of 
attorney fees which must be awarded is discretionary. In 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985), the court also 
held that attorney fees are not to be determined on the basis 
of an equitable standard, but that when awarded as allowed by 
law, are awarded as a matter of legal right. 
In Traynor, the contractual provision was not one 
awarding fees to the prevailing party, but one in which the 
parties agreed to payment of attorney fees for any action 
brought to enforce the agreement or any right arising out of 
breach. The provision in the Individual Guaranty (Exhibit 4) 
uses this same language. In Traynor, the court on appeal found 
that each party was successful in one or more points and 
unsuccessful on others and that therefore each had successfully 
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sued to enforce the agreement and was entitled to an award of 
attorney fees. 
In the Turtle Management, Inc. case, supra, the provision 
interpreted by the Supreme Court was one which stated: 
The cost of enforcing this Agreement including 
reasonable attorney's fees should be borne by 
the party in default. 
In that case, the court awarded attorney fees against the 
party in default, but only those attorney fees incurred in 
connection with that specific party's default. In the Turtle 
Management case, the defendant in default was in default 
because he had violated a covenant not to compete. 
In Cabrera, supra, the court sets a standard for 
determining the amount of reasonable attorney fees. (Both the 
Asset Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 1) and the Promissory Note 
(Exhibit 2) provide for payment of reasonable attorney fees.) 
The Court in Cabrera stated: 
Reasonable attorney's fees are not measured by 
what an attorney actually bills nor is the 
number of hours spent on the case determinative 
in computing fees. . . . The Court may 
consider, among other factors, the difficulty 
of the litigation, the efficiency of the 
attorneys in presenting the case, the 
reasonableness of the number of hours charged 
on the case, the fee customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services, the amount 
involved in the case, and the result attained, 
and the expertise of the attorneys involved. 
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Cabrera/ at 624-25. In that case, the court found that 
awarding attorney fees in excess of the damage awarded was 
reasonable and proper. 
B#
 Neale Broadcast is entitled to an award of fees as 
the prevailing party. 
In Idaho, the prevailing party is the party which 
prevails on the main issue in the case. Chadderdon v. King, 
659 P.2d 160 (Idaho App. 1983). In Arizona, the party with the 
greater net result is the prevailing party. Wolinasky v. 
Miller, 704 P.2d 811 (Ariz. App. 1985), Ocean West Contractors 
v. Halec Const. Co., 600 P.2d 1102 (Ariz. 1979). In Alaska, a 
party is the prevailing party even if it does not recover the 
full measure of relief prayed for, and a litigant which defeats 
a claim of great potential liability may be the prevailing 
party. Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54 (Ala. 1976). The 
Oregon Supreme Court has held that there can only be one 
prevailing party in an action even in litigation involving 
counterclaims, and that prevailing party is the one receiving 
the net award. Pelett v. Welch, 694 P.2d 574 (Or. App. 1985). 
Plaintiffs argue in their Brief that, because plaintiffs 
tendered into Court the sum of $89,587.16 in conjunction with 
filing their Complaint, such tender constituted an 
acknowledgment of their obligation to pay to defendant the full 
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amount due and owing under the contract, less such offsets as 
the Court would allow. (R. 1-4; 47-51) Plaintiffs then argue 
that, although the Court awarded judgment to defendant on its 
counterclaim for the balance due on the Promissory Mote 
together with interest and costs, defendant recovered only the 
sum that plaintiffs had acknowledged from the beginning was 
due. Therefore, because plaintiffs were found to be entitled 
to an offset and had already tendered the balance due on the 
Note, plaintiffs assert that they were entitled to recover 
attorneys' fees as the prevailing party, and the award of 
attorneys' fees to the defendant is argued to be erroneous. 
Plaintiffs' alleged tender actually meant nothing. No 
funds ever changed hands until the Court's order of May 1983 
when plaintiffs were ordered to pay defendant some $57,000.00 
and to deposit $30,000.00 of disputed funds, which was not paid 
into Court until July, 1984. The issue of which party is 
prevailing is governed by Highland Construction Co. v. 
Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981). In Highland, a 
subcontractor brought an action against a general contractor 
for damages allegedly caused by defective construction plans 
and unreasonable delay and the general contractor 
counterclaimed for declaratory judgment on certain issues. The 
general contractor admitted it owed and voluntarily paid the 
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excavating subcontractor the amount the excavating 
subcontractor had claimed that it was owed. This Court held 
that where the general contractor admitted owing and 
voluntarily paid the amount the subcontractor claimed it was 
owed in its action for damages after the action had been 
commenced, the subcontractor was prevailing party on that 
particular cause of action and entitled to an award of 
attorneys1 fees under the statute awarding attorneys' fees to 
the prevailing party. 
Regarding the issue of whether or not the subcontractor 
was the "prevailing party/1 the Court further added: 
It should make no difference whether the 
plaintiff recovers money from the defendant 
during the course of the action by voluntary 
payment or whether the plaintiff recovers that 
amount by a judgment. In both instances, the 
plaintiff has recovered money by virtue of its 
action. 
Highland, at 1038. 
In summary, defendant submits that it is the prevailing 
party under any of the standards set forth in the cases 
articulated above. Pursuant to the more narrow provision of 
the Promissory Note, the defendant is entitled to all attorney 
fees and costs incurred in connection with any recovery on the 
Promissory Note, and as set forth in the provision in the 
Guaranty, all costs of enforcement and collection of 
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indebtedness are to be borne by the Guarantor, plaintiff Lacy, 
Accordingly, the trial court's award of attorney's fees to 
plaintiffs was clearly erroneous. 
Further, with regard to the issue of fees, Neale 
Broadcast requests that the Court award it an additional sum 
equal to all of the additional attorneys1 fees incurred in 
defense of this action since the fees were calculated by the 
Court. The fees incurred in connection with those matters 
after conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the trial 
include preparation of proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, written closing argument, preparation of 
the final findings, conclusions and judgment, post-trial 
motions, defense of petition for Writ of Mandamus and this 
appeal. As argued above, such an award is authorized by the 
terms of the Promissory Note and Guaranty executed by 
plaintiffs in favor of defendants. Fees to be included would 
be those relating to the preparation of the Closing Argument 
and responses to plaintiffs1 post trial motions and those 
pursuant to this appeal. Defendant also asks that the unpaid 
portion of the Judgment bear interest throughout the pendency 
of this appeal, as authorized by Rule 32, Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
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POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY AND WITHIN 
ITS DISCRETION IN AMENDING THE JUDGMENT TO ADD 
A SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IN ORDER TO CONFORM TO 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 25 
OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. 
Plaintiffs have presented three arguments in support of 
their appeal of this issue. The first argument is that Rule 
2.8 of the Loca] Rules governed the procedure to amend the 
Judgment previously entered. The second argument is that the 
April 7th Order actually changed the payee of the Judgment, and 
was not simply a correction of a clerical error, namely, 
omission of a social security number. Plaintiffs1 third 
argument is that this Court should make its judgment effective 
against Sterrett Neale, to the extent of the funds it claims 
were wrongfully disbursed. 
In reply, Neale Broadcast asserts that Sterrett Neale is 
not a party before the Court, and no judgment can be made 
effective against him. Plaintiffs have not appealed the 
dismissal of Sterrett Neale from the action before the trial 
court. Furthermore, defendant submits that plaintiffs1 
argument that the April 7th Order actually changed the payee of 
the Judgment is merely an attempt to place before the Court 
another issue not argued below. As a consequence, defendant 
believes that plaintiffs1 only argument regarding this issue is 
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whether it is Rule 2.8 or Rule 2.9 of the Local Rules which 
should be applied in this situation. 
The motion in question was not a Rule 2.8 motion. Rule 
2.8 of the Local Rules covers "all motions except uncontested 
or ex parte matters." The motion was an ex parte, uncontested 
matter because the right to the funds had already been 
adjudicated. There is no merit whatsoever to plaintiffs1 
objection to the addition of a social security number to 
conform with Administrative Order No. 25. In fact/ defendant 
finds it difficult to imagine what testimony or evidence could 
have been offered as relevant to the issue if a hearing had 
been held prior to disbursement. 
According to Rule 62(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, execution may "issue immediately upon entry of 
judgment" and a stay of execution may be obtained only upon 
"approval of supersedeas bond by the court." Accordingly, the 
lack of a social security number was all that prevented 
distribution of the funds on any date after March 24/ 1987/ and 
before May 15, 1987/ the date upon which plaintiffs posted 
their supersedeas bond. 
If any local rule was applicable in the situation, it is 
Rule 2.9. Rule 2.9 provides: 
Copies of judgments and/or orders shall be 
served upon opposing counsel before being 
presented to the court for signature 
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notice of objections thereto shall be submitted 
to the court and counsel within five days after 
service. 
The motion and order were mailed April 4, 1987, and signed 
April 7, 1987. Any objections should have been filed by April 
13, 1987, (five days plus three days for mailing). Plaintiffs 
filed nothing until April 16, 1987, failing to respond within 
the required time periods for objection under Rule 2.9. 
Plaintiffs may argue that the April 7 Order was signed by 
the court before April 13, the expiration of the time period 
for objection. In Tolboe Construction Co. v. Staker Paving and 
Construction Co., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984), a judgment was 
signed by the court the day after it was presented by counsel. 
Opposing counsel filed an objection within five days after 
service as required by Rule 2.9, and appealed from the 
judgment. The Utah Supreme Court held that the rule 
requirements were met whether the judge signed the judgment 
when presented or after waiting five days so long as the 
parties in question had five days in which to object. This 
Court reasoned: 
The requirement as well as the rule itself are 
binding only upon counsel, not upon the trial 
court. The rule does not therefore preclude 
any prejudice to the plaintiff by reason of the 
court's early signing of the documents, 
inasmuch as plaintiff's timely filing of 
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objections preserved any claim it had with 
respect to the documents and plaintiff received 
a hearing upon those objections just as it 
would have had the court waited the full five 
days before signing the documents. For all 
these reasons, we hold that Rule 2.9 was fully 
satisfied in this case. 
Tolboe, at 849. 
Plaintiff allowed their five days to expire in this 
case. Just as in Tolboe, however, they received a hearing upon 
their objections. (P. 391-93) Defendant submits that Rule 2.9 
has been satisfied. 
Neale Broadcast also submits that this Amendment was 
merely a correction of a clerical error. As set forth in the 
case of Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 
1201, 1206 (Utah 1983), a clerical mistake is defined as "a 
type of mistake or omission mechanical in nature which is 
apparent on the record and which does not involve a legal 
decision or judgment by an attorney." Under Rule 60(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court may correct 
clerical mistakes in judgments at any time, with or without a 
motion by any party. Defendant's motion was clearly a request 
to amend to correct a clerical error, that of failing to 
conform to the Fourth District procedure of requiring a social 
security number prior to the distribution of monies. Such a 
correction is not subject to plaintiffs1 objection. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs are simply asking this Court to substitute its 
judgment for that of the trial court on contested factual 
issues* According to Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 
32, that the Court cannot do. Newmeyerf s 
challenge to the trial courtfs factual findings 
as to the relative contributions of the parties 
amounts to nothing more than an attempt to 
re-try the matter on appeal. There was 
evidence supporting the positions of both 
parties. It was for the trial court to resolve 
the conflicts. . . . 
Newmeyer, at 33. 
With one exception, defendant submits the findings of the 
trial court are supported by the evidence. Defendant submits 
that the finding that plaintiffs were entitled to an offset for 
items of defective equipment was erroneous. 
Defendant asserts that it was the prevailing party and 
entitled to an award of attorneys1 fees, but that the award of 
fees to plaintiffs was a misapplication of principles of law. 
Defendant requests that it be awarded an additional sum equal 
to the amount of fees incurred since the conclusion of the 
evidentiary portion of the trial, including preparation of 
findings, conclusions, judgment, post-trial motions, petition 
for Writ of Mandamus and appeal. 
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That portion of the Judginent awarding fees and offset to 
the plaintiffs should be overturned. In all other findings, 
the decision of the trial court should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of March, 1988. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Stephen L. Henriod 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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